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Class Movements in the New South Africa: Post-Colonial Politics, Neocolonialism, and Mimicry 
in Pieter-Dirk Uys’s MacBeki: A Farce to be Reckoned With 
 
Introduction 
In her essay “Reconciling Acts: Theatre beyond the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission” Marcia Blumberg identifies 2001 as the beginning of a “second interregnum” for 
South Africans (139). Making this claim, Blumberg’s temporal model outlines two phases of 
post-apartheid drama: “an initial period of euphoria, patience and hope” that begins with Nelson 
Mandela’s inauguration and a second interregnum after “the Mandela years” marked by a 
“desperation to break silences” (139). Blumberg’s two-part division of South Africa’s post-
apartheid history builds on Grant Farred’s argument that the nation is going through an 
“idiosyncratic interregnum,” moving “between reconciliation and disaffection” (64). Adapting 
Farred’s theory to South African drama, Blumberg posits that some dramatic productions stage 
disaffection towards continuing oppression, especially black experiences of poverty and 
economic exploitation, while other performances “stage successful acts of reconciliation” by 
voicing concerns of minority groups after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (140). For 
Blumberg the second interregnum is a period plagued by instability and morbid symptoms, a 
time of transition when drama spurs a broad rethinking and reworking of the nation’s identity 
(140). 
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Mapping the fragmented social and political landscape of the second interregnum, this 
paper analyzes the portrayal of the new black upper class – politicians and young professionals – 
seeking wealth and territory in Pieter-Dirk Uys’s MacBeki: A Farce to be Reckoned With (2008). 
Using farce to highlight corruption and entitlement problems within President Thabo Mbeki’s 
administration, Uys foregrounds the increasingly tenuous division between classes in the new 
South Africa. Oppression occurs economically, but also culturally and socially as indigenous 
customs and knowledge are displaced by characters that revere and adopt colonial culture. 
Embracing the social codes and mannerisms of European or apartheid colonizers, colonial 
mimics in MacBeki highlight a South African nation-state that, while undergoing a process of 
decolonization, is still jaundiced by South Africa’s colonial legacyi. In Uys’s play escape from 
idealizing colonial codes and language in the postcolonial moment is achieved through 
hybridization, blending European and African cultures in MacBeki.  
In his essay “Of Mimicry and Man,” Homi Bhabha defines the colonial mimic as a 
recognizable colonized other who is “almost the same [as the colonizer], but not quite” (126) due 
to his inability to “fully become that which he is not” (128). In essence, the colonial mimic is 
“the effect of a flawed colonial mimesis” which emphatically prevents the colonized from 
gaining acceptance within the colonizer’s position of power. While the colonial mimic may 
master the language, knowledge, and even imitate the gestures of the colonial power, they are 
barred from acceptance because of their ethnic difference. In Bhabha’s words, they are “[a]lmost 
the same but not white” (30). Castigating corrupt leaders and citizens who imitate colonial 
culture, language, and customs, Uys’s work speaks out against the danger of perpetuating 
colonial forms of cultural and economic oppression. For Uys the imitation of colonial behaviour 
leads either to neocolonial abuses of power or continuing social divisions, especially amongst 
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classes. Castigating divisions continuing to affect the contemporary nation-state by ridiculing 
hypocritical leaders, MacBeki also underscores the artificiality of colonial performances of 
power by showing how the colonizer’s gestures can be repeated in order to ridicule. 
 
Political and Economic Context 
In a recent article in the Daily Maverick, political analyst Chris Gibbons describes South 
Africa as “a society that remains deeply divided, perhaps more so now than at any time since 
1994.” Although describing a single event in South Africa’s recent history – public outcry 
towards a nude painting of African National Congress (hereafter ANC) President Jacob Zuma 
created by Brett Murray – Gibbons’s assertion captures the general condition of the post-
apartheid nation-state. For example, while Gibbons illustrates the clear political and racial 
divisions still haunting South Africa, foreign affairs reporter Bill Schiller uncovers a similar 
trend when analyzing class and economic differences amongst citizens. Comparing 
unemployment rates in South Africa between 1994 and 2012, Schiller notes that at independence 
the nation had a 20% unemployment rate whereas eight years later the rate had risen to a 
staggering 33%, “when including those who have given up looking for work.”ii Taking these 
figures into account, Schiller draws a similar conclusion to that of Gibbons: divisions between 
groups, especially wealthy and poor South Africans, are growing wider than at independence and 
people are becoming increasingly disenfranchised. 
Extending from the growing division between rich and poor in South Africa is the 
uncomfortable reality that the country is continuing to sustain apartheid economic inequalitiesiii; 
this is occurring in a modified form however, with a black upper class also potentially exploiting 
poor black South Africans. As political analyst Brent Meersman notes, reports as early as 2002 
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suggest “that inequality was starting to track class not racial lines,” and that “Stats SA in 2008 
confirmed that the highest inequality is now within the African [black] population,” not between 
white and black South Africans as was the case historically (emphasis added). Many critics of 
the current system of economic redress criticize BEE – the Black Economic Empowerment 
policy – as a process that has exacerbated divisions in South Africa. Described by the 
Government of South Africa as: “[a] necessary… intervention to address the systematic 
exclusion of the majority of South Africans from full participation in the economy,” BEE seeks 
to rebalance historical inequalities through affirmative action policies, private-sector agreements, 
and by increasing the proportion of black South Africans owning and managing businesses. 
Contrary to the goals of this economic strategy – to facilitate economic equality – many South 
Africans believe that BEE has encouraged a number of black politicians and entrepreneurs to 
continue exploiting poor populations historically disempowered during apartheid. 
A system of economic exploitation is precisely what one encounters when reading 
Meersman’s criticism that “BEE businesses [are] engaged in ruthless labour practices, while 
tenderpreneurs further impoverish (if not actually kill) the poor.” In the wake of the Marikana 
mine massacre the extent of the divide between wealthy and poor became clear. As Schiller 
reminds his readers, while platinum traded at US$1,600 an ounce, miners at the Lonmin-owned 
mine in Marikana used open-pit toilets and often occupied inadequate housing. Lonmin is an 
excellent example of South Africa’s current neocolonial condition because the mine is owned by 
a British company based in London but has local South African members who encouraged the 
police intervention that led to the deaths of many protestorsiv. The control of the Marikana mine 
by foreign investors and the role local politicians and police played in violently disbanding strike 
 Rose 5 
lines exemplify Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s assertion that neocolonialism is sustained through 
economic reliance abroad and oppression of citizens and workers locally (12). 
Robert Young’s statement that independence in many colonised nations “brought to light 
an apparently new form of subservience, to the economic system of capitalist power” captures 
the essence of what is happening in South Africa (45). While the political system is under new 
management, plays such as MacBeki make clear that the incoming leaders are eager to maintain 
the exploitative practices of their predecessors by placing their own interests above those of the 
general population. As a result, economic equality has been slow to arrive and corruption 
remains rampant throughout the countryv.  
Although this paper focuses on a white Afrikaner playwright’s fear of corruption, the 
play offers a nuanced examination of economic abuse amongst South Africa’s black population. 
Reflecting current economic trends in the country – 64% of black South Africans continue to live 
in poverty – the play foregrounds the multiple class and educational divisions within a racial 
group traditionally viewed as homogeneous under apartheid’s system of racial categorization 
(Schiller). Furthermore, while I seek to examine a non-black perspective on the new black elite, 
one should not assume that criticism only comes from non-black South Africans. As major 
playwrights such as Zakes Mda exemplify, there is also a body of criticism from indigenous 
South African artists attacking the “unbridled accumulation of wealth in the so-called black 
empowerment frenzy” (Amato xviii) and staging dissent through dramatic styles that intermingle 
the “stink of decayed old Europe and corrupt new Africa” (Amato xiv). Mda’s words, taken from 
a note he wrote to his publishers, express the disenfranchisement many South Africans carry 
towards economic imbalances in the current nation-statevi. 
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Pieter-Dirk Uys’s MacBeki: A Farce to be Reckoned With 
With Uys, one can understand how drama – historically used for political protest and 
staging “sites of conflict” in apartheid South Africa – continues to play a key role in criticising 
government shortfalls after 1994 (Orkin, Drama 5). As playwright, Uys has a well documented 
history of using drama as a weapon against political injustice. He is one of the longest standing 
satirists in South Africa, with a broad and detailed literary career spanning from his first play 
Faces in the Wall in 1969 to the present dayvii. In the book Subversive Laughter: The Liberating 
Power of Comedy, Ron Jenkins asserts that Uys historically used comic improvisation and 
theatrical satire to highlight anxieties affecting white South Africans during apartheid (94). In 
making this claim Jenkins notes that Uys’s work was so influential that, “In July 1992, the 
Sunday magazine of the Johannesburg Times ran an article featuring Evita [a character Uys 
performed in drag] as one of the decade’s ten most influential South Africans, [in] a list that 
included former president P.W. Botha and Nelson Mandela” (95). Understanding Uys’s 
mainstream status and his long history of politically subversive writing helps to identify him as a 
canonical satirist in South African theatre circles. 
Uys’s MacBeki, first performed at The Little Theatre 25 February 2009 by University of 
Cape Town drama students, highlights corruption and hypocrisy within President Mbeki’s 
administration (v). Attacking shortfalls of the BEE system, embezzlement, and Mbeki’s 
contentious denial of the link between HIV and AIDS, the play is a scathing response to the 
failures Uys sees in the South African government. As a work of political protest, MacBeki was 
widely praised by critics for its response to inadequacies in Mbeki’s leadership, being hailed as 
“the first theatrical rendering in 15 years that directly confronts and exposes those who would 
wield enormous power over our lives” (Thamm). Using farce to highlight corruption and the 
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sense of entitlement to wealth held by leaders within Mbeki’s administration, MacBeki 
foregrounds the increasing distance between political leaders and their voter base in the new 
South Africa. At the same time, casting Mbeki as a mimic man, Uys draws direct connections 
between South Africa’s current class crisis and the nation’s history of colonization. 
MacBeki, a parody of William Shakespeare’s Macbeth, farcically portrays Mbeki’s rise to 
power in the new South Africa. Incorporating famous politicians into Shakespeare’s play, South 
African leaders such as Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma make appearances, renamed Maduba, 
MacBeki, and MacZum respectively; in doing so the play speaks to different generations of 
South Africans and reflects major changes within the ANC leadership since 1994. Other 
prominent ANC politicians depicted in the play include Mbeki’s political rival Cyril 
Ramaphosaviii as Ramabanquo, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel as McTrev, and Health Minister 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as Lady Manta, MacBeki’s wife. The play’s Porter is a white liberal 
seeking inclusion in the new South Africa. At moments he exhibits a desire to be viewed as a 
model for successful transformation, while at others he is also quick to point out the limitations 
affirmative action policies place on his inclusion in the workforce and the nationix. It is due to 
such behaviour that theatre practitioner Megan Furniss argues the character is an embodiment of 
“every white man in the country,” although the Porter’s dialogue (38) and his imitation of Celine 
Dion at the conclusion of the play (87) identify him specifically as Uys, who is well known for 
his drag acts. Collecting all of these figures on stage, MacBeki farcically recreates South Africa’s 
post-apartheid political history ahead of the 2009 national election.  
In his rewriting of Macbeth Uys recasts the play in a post-colonial South African context. 
For example, Shakespeare’s witches are cast as news reporters, able to predict MacBeki’s future 
because, quite literally, they write it. Subsequently, MacBeki’s rise to power is facilitated 
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through publicity campaigns and deceit. The play begins with Maduba serving as King of the 
Rainbow Nation, overseeing the transition between apartheid and the new South Africa. Soon 
after the play’s opening MacBeki is promoted to Deputy, causing Lady Manta to plot a coup to 
secure the throne for her husband. MacBeki carries out the plot peacefully, seizing power 
through hypnosis by subduing Maduba with an iPod full of Celine Dion songs. Crowning 
himself King of South Africa, MacBeki sets about limiting the power of other characters such as 
Lord Ramabanquo by relocating them to lucrative positions in corporations formerly managed by 
white South Africans. While MacBeki’s plan to acquire ultimate power works for a short period, 
his greed and materialism ultimately lead to his downfall. MacBeki is overthrown when 
MacZum wins popular support of the people at a convention in Polokwane forest, resulting in a 
confrontation with MacBeki at Luthuli Castle. MacBeki refuses to abandon the fortress, choosing 
to oppose MacZum at all costs. Importantly though, unlike Shakespeare’s play, Uys’s work 
concludes with the deposed King escaping death by going “back into the collective leadership” 
(vi). In doing so, Uys’s conclusion consciously avoids the violent end his audience anticipates as 
political opponents, workers, and impoverished citizens storm Luthuli Castle to oust MacBeki. 
Uys’s avoidance of a violent conclusion in MacBeki reconfigures Shakespeare’s tragedy 
as a comedy. Due to the changes Uys makes to Shakespeare’s play, MacBeki is not a tragic 
character. My assessment here is based on Mark Roche’s definition of tragedy as “an action in 
which the hero’s greatness leads inexorably to suffering” (49). For Roche, tragedy is the contrast 
between a hero’s greatness and “the negative consequences of this greatness” (49). The tragic 
flaw that causes a hero’s fall is a result of their magnanimous attributes; these can include 
characteristics such as virtue, loyalty, discipline, or courage (49). MacBeki is not a tragic hero 
because his flaws are greed, egotism, and hypocrisy. Although he is quite intelligent and well 
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educated, he ultimately fails because of his self-centredness. It is MacBeki’s disregard for those 
around him that causes his fall, not his intelligence; this prevents Uys’s play from being 
interpreted as a tragedy. However, as theatre reviewer Robyn Sassen posits, Uys’s reworking of 
Macbeth into a comedy does not prevent the play’s serious political messages concerning 
corruption, xenophobia, and governmental misinformation from coming through: “[MacBeki] is 
a farce, not a tragedy, even if the underlying layers hit home with profundity more than the 
rolling heads and blood baths in other interpretations.” Sassen’s review exemplifies how Uys 
embeds salient political criticisms beneath the surface of his comedy, highlighting a number of 
national crises such as HIV/AIDS, political corruption, and instability in the ANC leadership. 
Written in 2008, MacBeki serves as an exemplary model of second interregnum drama. 
While a number of theorists outline different temporal models for studying post-apartheid 
theatre, it is widely accepted by scholars such as Greg Homann and Blumberg that the period 
immediately following the 1994 elections marks a time when drama celebrating the nation’s 
achievements prevailed. Homann labels this period a “honeymoon” for the nation, a time when 
“[o]ur achievements were inviolable. Criticism and pessimism were almost taboo” (6). Although 
there were still large social, racial, and economic divisions during South Africa’s initial period of 
independence, a general exhilaration prevailed that kept many citizens from openly voicing 
discontentment. Following this transitional period of euphoria, Blumberg argues a second 
interregnum occurs in South Africa, a period where disenfranchisement is often voiced openly 
(139). MacBeki adheres to this temporal model because, unlike the jubilation of the first 
interregnum, Uys’s play underscores government corruption and the continuing economic 
exploitation of many working class South Africans. In doing so, the play carries out an attack 
against a number of political leaders, particularly Mbeki and Zuma. 
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As Uys poignantly states in MacBeki’s introduction, “My fury and frustration had to be 
filtered through that essential definition of 49% anger and 51% entertainment” (v). In this regard 
farce helps Uys find a balance between political criticism and humour as the comic form mixes 
laughter with disdain. As Chris Baldick explains, “[farce is] a kind of comedy that inspires 
hilarity mixed with panic and cruelty in its audience through an increasingly rapid and 
improbable series of ludicrous confusions, physical disasters, and sexual innuendos among its 
stock characters” (82). It is precisely this type of humour that occurs throughout Uys’s play as 
the plot endures increasingly fantastic twists while at the same time MacBeki and Lady Manta 
fall farther and farther out of favour with characters in the play, and by extension its audience. 
While comically improbable events occur – such as Maduba being ousted from power through 
the hypnotic singing of Celine Dion or the sudden relocation of an entire forest in the play’s final 
act – King MacBeki is consistently ridiculed for being a corrupt leader who mimics colonial 
idealsx.  
Portraying MacBeki as a mimic man, Uys’s play contains a number of moments when 
MacBeki brandishes his European education as proof of his intelligence and ability to lead. In a 
sequence when MacBeki is plotting with Lady Manta to oust Maduba from power, MacBeki 
absurdly announces that he has “read enough to understand the need for original thought” and 
that his genius will help to assure their success (18). This statement is ridiculous within the 
context of the play because, from its very outset, the audience sees the comic flaw of MacBeki’s 
hubris. MacBeki believes he is superior to other political competitors precisely because he can 
mimic colonial performances of power. Educated in exile during apartheid, he believes that he is 
the only suitable choice to govern the new South Africa.  
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During another pivotal moment in the play MacBeki’s monologue reveals the sense of 
entitlement that grows out of this European education. Announcing that he feels a “poetic 
moment coming on,” MacBeki addresses the audience directly as he composes a poem that 
describes his experiences studying abroad in Britain (5): 
I would sit in Brighton after classes, 
Sussex University was the place. 
Studying UK history and farces,  
Meanwhile dreaming of the day 
I would be only second in line to the rainbow throne. 
It is now all coming true. 
But there are some in my way, like you.  
Comrades always, star or runt, 
Comrades in a collective front (5-6).  
Critically, in this example, the play’s structure helps to show the inadequacy of MacBeki’s 
education. While MacBeki has read farces at Sussex University, his character is not able to 
realize he is living one. MacBeki’s purportedly advanced knowledge of farce does not guarantee 
he can see himself as ridiculous. He cannot identify his own life is a farce. As a result, MacBeki 
is unable to predict, and thus prevent, his own overthrow in the final pages of the play. 
Furthermore, this quotation illustrates that MacBeki’s knowledge of history is primarily 
focused on the United Kingdom. When challenged on his absence during apartheid, MacBeki 
defends himself by stating: “Not all of us could languish in prison, Comrade MacZum. Someone 
had to be there to answer the phones, [and] collect financial support” (27). MacBeki’s 
inappropriate response is not intended to redeem his role in the anti-apartheid struggle, but 
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rather, his comment is intended to draw scorn. MacBeki’s argument that he needed to be abroad 
to collect financial support suggests his greed precedes apartheid’s end. While many comrades 
successfully carried on the struggle from abroad, MacBeki’s involvement in resisting apartheid is 
portrayed as liminal, contradicting the historical reality of Mbeki’s time spent in exilexi. This is 
the realm of farce because Uys downplays Mbeki’s extensive historical involvement in the anti-
apartheid struggle for the sake of criticizing the politician’s desire for wealth and his support of 
capitalist policies once President of South Africa. 
Throughout these examples there is something inherently humorous in MacBeki’s 
performance of colonial mimicry. He is a comic character because he inadvertently betrays his 
own flaws. While he acknowledges and at numerous points embraces his position as a colonial 
mimic, MacBeki problematically believes he has total control over the process and can 
manipulate it to his advantage. At one point in the play MacBeki goes so far as to proclaim: “The 
enemy trusted me. They saw me for what I displayed for their scrutiny. But remember, I was 
educated in Sussex halls of hallowed wisdom and so I can act like them while thinking like me” 
(15). Making this assertion, MacBeki puts forward the argument that he can control the process 
of colonial mimesis. Being able to “act like them while thinking like me,” MacBeki claims to be 
able to perform colonial behaviour at opportune moments, while preventing himself from being 
controlled by colonial structures of power (15). MacBeki’s stance is flawed here because, as 
Bhabha states, “Mimicry repeats rather than re-presents” (128). And in the case of this play, 
Bhabha’s words hold true. As a mimic man MacBeki repeats, or continues to sustain, the 
purported superiority of European culturexii. For example, in the quotation previously cited, 
MacBeki still reveres the hallowed halls of Sussex University – an education that causes ANC 
rivals such as MacZum to defer to MacBeki’s judgementxiii (26).  
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Although MacBeki imagines he is able to cease privileging colonial culture at any 
moment and simply think for himself, the decisions he makes throughout the play point to a 
process of mimicry that is unable to escape imitating colonial authority. MacBeki’s bid to gain 
power, predicated on his European education and mannerisms, relies on a hierarchy that he can 
never fully surmount. There is always a white European at the top of mimicry’s system of power, 
a colonizer who refuses to extend privilege to the colonized on the basis of their racial 
difference. This is the meaning behind Bhabha’s phrase: “[a]lmost the same but not white” (130). 
Regardless of how well MacBeki masters European cultural codes and knowledge, such as 
developing an appreciation for Vivaldi because “it soothes [his]… native intelligence” (18), he 
can never fully master the system he relies upon. At the same time MacBeki is also unable to 
escape the system as easily as he claims. Rather than re-presenting colonial authority, a process 
that would rework or subvert the structured hierarchy upon which colonial mimicry relies, 
MacBeki must continually praise the superiority of European culture in order to sustain his own 
privileged position in South Africa. It is due to this system of control that MacBeki’s claim to be 
able to “act like them while thinking like me” is, in the context of the play, impossible (15). 
Unconsciously, MacBeki betrays himself. 
Henri Bergson’s Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic helps to explain how 
self-betrayal produces humour. According to Bergson, “what is essentially laughable is what is 
done automatically. In a vice, even in a virtue, the comic is that element by which the person 
unwittingly betrays himself – the involuntary gesture or the unconscious remark. 
Absentmindedness is always comical” (71). MacBeki is an absentminded character because his 
remarks and actions constantly betray his flaws. His belief that he can control his mimicry is 
unsound because, through his thoughts and actions, he continues to consciously and 
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unconsciously imitate gestures of European culture. Even MacBeki’s rejection of critics who call 
him a “coconut” – a derogatory term implying a non-white South African is a colonial mimic – 
indicates he is a new type of colonizer (15). MacBeki’s retort, “They say ‘Coconut’? No. 
Coconuts fall off a tree. I will become that tree and all who follow me will be rich as golden 
fruit,” establishes him as a colonizer in the metaphor because he envisions himself as the tree 
producing coconuts, or in the metaphor’s terms, additional colonial mimics (15). Throughout 
such examples MacBeki absentmindedly repeats colonial norms without effectively subverting 
them. 
The humour extending from MacBeki’s behaviour, gestures, and speech in Uys’s play 
creates laughter that assails corrupt and hypocritical leaders. The audience laughs at MacBeki 
because we despise him as a corrupt and self-serving leader whose flaws include ignorance, 
egotism, and greed. As one reviewer notes, the play “airs the country’s dirty laundry with glee” 
and leaves audiences “laughing at the hypocrisy and chiding the inadequacies” in their leaders 
(Bosman). Laughter is thus a social corrective, working to highlight and castigate MacBeki’s 
numerous flaws, particularly his failure to live up to the expectations of his voters.  
Bergson argues that laughter can serve as a social corrective because it is “a social 
gesture that singles out and represses a kind of absentmindedness in men and in events” (46). It 
is in this light that MacBeki becomes a tool to ridicule Mbeki’s shortfalls. As Uys explains in an 
interview, “We make it clear who’s who in our zoo. I am not deconstructing Shakespeare, but 
Thabo Mbeki.” (Daggers). Presenting Mbeki as a colonial mimic in the play, Uys links apathy 
towards addressing the gap between rich and poor in the nation back to apartheid and power 
imbalances between the colonizer and the colonized. MacBeki’s colonial mimesis is yet another 
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threat to the nation, extending out of apartheid and potentially ushering in a new era of, in the 
words of the play, Mbekivellian intrigues (Uys v). 
In this light MacBeki can be read as both a critique of Mbeki and of a post-colonial 
fixation on European cultural superiority. While the audience laughs at MacBeki because he 
unwittingly betrays himself throughout the play, MacBeki also serves as a double for the English 
colonial master. In doing so, he also mocks the admiration and esteem associated with European 
culture and education. MacBeki’s ability to pass as a colonial mimic – regardless of how poorly 
he fulfills the role – illustrates how colonial notions of cultural superiority rely on performance; 
language, knowledge, and even gestures are codified and repeated to show one’s status. 
Bergson’s description of the automaton helps to explain how imitation leads to comedy. As 
Bergson states: 
I find that a certain movement of the head or arm, a movement always the same, 
seems to return at regular intervals. If I notice it and it succeeds in diverting my 
attention, if I wait for it to occur and it occurs when I expect it, then involuntarily 
I laugh. Why? Because I now have before me a machine that works automatically. 
This is no longer life, it is automatism established in life and imitating it. It 
belongs to the comic. This is also the reason why gestures, at which we never 
dreamt of laughing, become laughable when imitated by another individual… To 
imitate any one is to bring out the element of automatism he has allowed to creep 
into his person (22). 
The automatism – or predictability – of an imitation indicates absentmindedness in the individual 
being impersonated. In the case of Uys’s play, MacBeki produces both corrective laughter but 
also becomes a clown imitating the colonial master. In doing so, MacBeki exposes the reliance 
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of colonial authority on performance. As Bhabha explains, “The menace of mimicry is its double 
vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority” 
(129). MacBeki’s imitation of the colonial master reveals the generic performances of colonial 
superiority. Performing these gestures – even improperly – still gives MacBeki the advantage he 
needs to prevent rivals – such as MacZum and Lord Ramabanquo – from blocking his rise to 
power. 
Building on Uys’s remark that his play is “not deconstructing Shakespeare, but Thabo 
Mbeki,” I posit MacBeki should be read, more broadly, as a general critique of the dangers of 
mimicry and neocolonialism in the South African political system (Daggers). Although my 
paper has thus far focused on MacBeki’s mimicry of European culture and gestures, he also 
imitates colonial systems of governance and control. This is particularly apparent in MacBeki’s 
dealings with the three businessmen from Angla, Sosal, and Giltfelds. The three businessmen, 
beneficiaries from apartheid, originate “from the old structures” of South Africa and possess 
particular “expertise and talents” they believe will help MacBeki’s new government, namely in 
corrupt and dishonest dealings (36). The trio represent the wealthy business class from apartheid 
seeking to retain power after the nation’s transition to a free democracy. Although the men are 
clearly beneficiaries from apartheid’s injustices, MacBeki establishes a mutual relationship with 
them. As a result, the corporations continue to hold great economic sway over the post-apartheid 
nation while, at the same time, their finance corruptly backs MacBeki’s rule. 
 Representing a class that historically oppressed a majority of labouring black South 
Africans, Angla, Sosal, and Giltfelds’s inclusion in the post-apartheid nation highlights the 
continuation of economic and political inequality in the country. These characters represent “the 
old structures” of apartheid, but have a lot in common with MacBeki’s government (36). Most 
 Rose 17 
obviously, they are in business together. Noting that many of the comrades, especially MacBeki, 
“have learnt so well from… [the] old structures,” Angla acknowledges that South Africa’s 
leaders appear to be using similar strategies as the apartheid government to monitor citizens (42). 
In the play’s context the three men are discussing private business ventures in a bathroom of 
Luthuli Castle and presume the room continues to be bugged after the transfer of power in 1994. 
Similar to the days of apartheid when government-sanctioned surveillance was frequently used to 
uncover subversive activities, the businessmen believe MacBeki is using surveillance for control: 
“it used to be bugged in the old days. No reason to think they’ve removed all the things that were 
aimed at them. If you know what I mean” (42). Such accusations from former colonizers indicate 
MacBeki, in addition to imitating colonial culture, is also modelling himself off of colonial 
systems of control and dominance. 
Viewing apartheid as a system of colonization because of the physical and psychological 
oppression effected under “direct-rule domination” (Young 57) in a “non-democratic [apartheid] 
state” (Homann 2), MacBeki’s willingness to profit from systemic inequalities established during 
apartheid suggests he is simply another colonizing force, unable to fulfill his claim that he can 
“act like them while thinking like me” (15). MacBeki’s inability to accomplish the split that he 
envisions between his personal goals and the repetition of colonial oppression is his greatest 
shortfall. As a result, MacBeki continues to believe he is different from other colonizing powers 
while, simultaneously, continuing to support many of the institutions and systems of oppression 
that flourished during apartheid.  
MacBeki even convinces the three businessmen to hire Lord Ramabanquo, a political 
rival, to prevent the Lord from obstructing his progression to the throne. During the negotiations 
with the company representatives, MacBeki’s bargaining chip is the threat of affirmative action 
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and financial redistributions after apartheid. MacBeki threatens the men by stating: “You realise 
that those structures of the past cannot be tolerated any longer. Our people have been 
marginalised by minority-greed and manipulation” (36). Although one might hope this to be an 
indication MacBeki has had a change of heart, in reality it is only a ploy. As a result, MacBeki’s 
actions leave the power and influence of these businesses untouched because he assures them 
Ramabanquo will be “instrumental in adding noughts to your profit margins” (36). MacBeki’s 
decision seals Ramabanquo’s fate, condemning the man to a living-death trapped in CEO board 
meetings for the rest of his life (47). In this manner MacBeki continues the economic oppression 
established during apartheid, opening only a liminal space for corrupt comrades such as 
Ramabanquo to enter into the upper levels of business and politics in South Africa. MacBeki 
exploits the nation’s affirmative action policies to remove political opponents from office instead 
of using them for their intended purpose: to help rebalance economic disparities caused by 
apartheid labour restrictions. Disregarding the need to limit divisions between wealthy and poor 
citizens, MacBeki sustains systems of economic oppression that were a cornerstone of apartheid 
oppression. 
In essence, there is always – as Bhabha asserts – “a partial vision of the colonizer’s 
presence” (129). While one might be tempted to argue that MacBeki productively opens a space 
for black South Africans to attain wealth and political power in the new South Africa, the play 
indicates these opportunities are only available to influential political leaders and those educated 
abroad. Racial discrimination is largely succeeded by economic and political discrimination, 
continuing to perpetuate a system that keeps a majority of South Africans, especially non-white 
citizens, oppressed. Uys’s criticism throughout the play parallels historical condemnation 
levelled against Mbeki’s aloofness in addressing the needs of the poor (Friedman 120). 
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MacBeki’s co-conspirator, Lady Manta, underscores the couple’s intention to exploit 
economic imbalances by reminding MacBeki that, once he has completed his climb to power, the 
South African poor will be rewarded with his face on their coins (40). Or, as Lady Manta prefers 
to explain, “coin” because “few [of the poor] have more than one” (40). The imagery invoked in 
this example is salient to my discussion of mimicry because minting MacBeki’s face on South 
Africa’s currency would place his likeness in a location often reserved for imperial monarchs. By 
extension, the image of the minted coin also entertains the possibility that MacBeki can 
reproduce his likeness with a reduced emphasis on racial difference. Because mimicry is 
sustained through racial difference – “[a]lmost the same, but not white” (Bhabha 130) – 
MacBeki’s portrait on a coin would eschew any identification based on skin colour. Images on 
coins typically being minted without colour, Lady Manta offers MacBeki a way to distribute his 
likeness in a fashion identical to any European monarch. At the same time, her disregard for the 
poor shows no effort to rebalance the economic injustices wrought by apartheid. 
Although Uys’s introduction states the play’s intended target is Mbeki because Uys felt 
“he was not the right comrade for the job of building on the legacy of Nelson Mandela,” the 
work’s characters and events suggest corruption is more deeply embedded than Mbeki’s 
administration itself (v). For example, when planning MacBeki’s overthrow in Polokwane forest, 
MacZum’s dialogue indicates opposition forces are just as greedy as the politician they seek to 
oust:  
I see the overweight Politburo of the King arrive in their Hummers and 4x4s, 
hooting at the ordinary people in humble wagons and on tired donkeys, making an 
entrance like Emperors on a hunt. There are also many boys here too young to 
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have beards, but who will have joined our battle before they will be men. They 
are not impressed by the imbalance (67).  
In this instance MacZum’s comment aptly captures the massive economic divide between the 
politicians and their supporters. The humble wagons of the ordinary folk serve as a foil for the 
wealth and opulence of MacBeki’s affluent political rivals. Describing the Politburo as arriving 
“like Emperors on a hunt” one can presume that, even as opponents to MacBeki’s corruption, 
should any of them secure the lucrative throne of South Africa it is unlikely economic conditions 
will change significantly for the majority of voters who placed these leaders in power. So the 
common people are left in a bind: either support the corrupt mimicry of MacBeki or fall behind 
his former Politburo, themselves likened to emperors amongst the working class. Uys’s use of 
the term “Politburo,” the upper leadership of a communist party, suggests that socialist and pro-
communist South African leaders are equally as corrupt as their capitalist counterpartsxiv (67). 
MacZum’s use of the adjective “overweight” in this quotation is also important because 
of its association with greed (67); it is a term commonly used by Uys to describe the dishonesty 
of South Africa’s politicians. In a statement taken from another of Uys’s works – a website he 
created for a false political party – the satirist comically critiques the changing physical stature of 
politicians following South Africa’s first free elections. Noting that “corruption is in the width of 
the seat,” Uys jests: “Mandela’s cabinet of 1994 was trim, slim, elegant and looked their age of 
hope and optimism… [whereas the] same people today are so wobbly and bulbous, they can 
scarcely move without an entourage of underlings there to bounce them along” (DATE: 25 
January). Producing a similar type of criticism by equating body weight with corruption, the two 
examples caricature greedy politicians by exaggerating one “particular feature or detail” – their 
weight – to emphasize their corruption, greed, and apathy (Propp 64). In doing so, the “hope” 
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Uys associates with the Mandela years on his website (DATE: 25 January) is replaced with 
beardless youths who are “not impressed by the [economic] imbalance” of the subsequent Mbeki 
years (67). 
Using farce because it produces both humour and cruelty, in this instance encouraging the 
audience to scorn MacBeki, Uys plays an important role in South African politics and social 
change. The vital date of the play’s debut, just prior to the 2009 national vote, is underscored by 
a number of South African critics who assert the play is “downright good for democracy” 
(Thamm) and provides “some sobering perspectives just ahead of the elections” (Bosman). In 
this manner Uys’s work not only foregrounds the broad problems of corruption and economic 
abuse in the government, but does so at a watershed moment in South Africa’s political timeline. 
The play sits at a turning point in the second interregnum, being staged during a period of 
significant political changes in ANC leadership preceding the 2009 elections. Although the ANC 
won a clear victory, it was the first electoral retreat for the ANC since the first free elections in 
South Africa, indicating Uys is not alone in his criticismxv.  
Uys’s introduction to the play captures the political ambiguity at the time by recalling the 
swift political changes that led up to the April 2009 election: “Imagine my surprise when 
President Mbeki was thus swallowed and replaced. A daily pattern of scanning the news became 
essential. Who was the President today? The political landscape was changing so quickly that… 
[the play] was in constant danger of being outdone by events” (vi). Uys’s emphasis on a lack of 
visible political leadership within South Africa indicates a moment when serious questions 
needed to be asked about the political future of the ANC. The only two productions of MacBeki 
both occurred in South Africa prior to the April 22nd election: The Little Theatre in Cape Town 
in February 2009 and The Market Theatre, Johannesburg, in early April 2009 (Pieter-Dirk Uys 
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CV). The fact that Uys has not presented the play since 2009 suggests the timeliness of the 
production as a political response to the contemptible condition of the nation’s government at the 
close of Mbeki’s leadership; it also indicates the temporal limits of satire more generally, as a 
good satirist “must describe, decry, denounce the here and now” (Highet 17). The impact of the 
play diminishes outside its political moment, likely causing Uys to abandon it in favour of more 
recent productionsxvi.  
Strikingly, Uys’s criticism of government corruption in 2008 and 2009 appears to be 
uncomfortably apt in light of recent occurrences such as the Marikana mine disasterxvii and 
accusations that Mbeki’s successor, Zuma, has embezzled twenty-seven million dollars from the 
treasury to enhance his home with an airstrip and an underground bunker (Schiller). Attacking 
economic abuses of power and the sense of entitlement many politicians carried with them on 
their rise to power, Uys directs laughter towards those who should feel disgraced. As a line from 
MacBeki summarizes, “There’s an old saying: the dead will have their revenge. But worse than 
that is if the living need not seek revenge, because they hold the weapon of bitter shaming 
laughter” (51). It is precisely this type of shaming laughter that MacBeki produces, castigating 
colonial mimicry while also critiquing those who allow corruption and greed to occur. 
Concluding my analysis of MacBeki, I argue Uys’s solution to colonial mimicry can be 
located in the structure of the play itself. In addition to ridiculing government corruption and 
neocolonialism in South Africa, Uys’s MacBeki is also an important rewriting of Shakespeare in 
a post-apartheid context. The play occupies a space between Shakespearean drama and African 
politics. Many scholars note that during colonization Shakespearean texts were used as guides 
for language “and a measure of humanity itself” (Loomba & Orkin 1). As a result, Shakespeare’s 
works have been, and continue to be, widely distributed throughout the African continent. David 
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Johnson records that, in the 1930s, Shakespeare is one of the few elements of English high 
culture to be widely prized by indigenous African populations; beyond Shakespeare, “English 
high culture has a minority appeal” (223). So, for many colonized Africans, a mastery of 
Shakespeare indicates a mastery of English language and, by extension, identifies them with 
European high culture. Comparing this historical reality to Uys’s play, this is precisely what 
MacBeki attacks through its sustained criticism of colonial mimicry.   
Uys’s play borrows from Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Hamlet, but does so in ways that 
make the adaptation distinctly South African. Uys’s MacBeki is a hybrid reworking of 
Shakespeare. Using the term “combination” to describe the inspiration behind his play, Uys 
highlights a cognizant blending of Shakespeare’s works with his own political criticism: “By 
July 2008 I had this new play on paper. It seemed a logical progression as a combination of the 
best of drama as inspired by William Shakespeare and the worst in politics as signalled by Thabo 
Mbeki” (MacBeki v). Uys’s rewriting of Shakespeare’s Macbeth highlights the cultural 
superiority some post-colonial Africans attribute to Shakespeare and a British education, 
exemplified by MacBeki’s rise to power which is facilitated through his recitation of 
Shakespeare (15). At the same time, MacBeki also reclaims Shakespeare’s works from solely 
being associated with acts of colonial violence, as Shakespeare was historically used “in the 
classroom as [an] ideological weapon of oppression” during apartheid (Orkin Possessing, 191). 
Orkin’s remark that Shakespeare was chosen by apartheid educators because his texts would 
“impede rather than facilitate [the] acquisition of [English]” (Possessing 191) is reversed during 
the debut of Uys’s play, which was performed entirely by a cast whose first language was not 
English (Jordan).  
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Rather than mimicking European dramatic styles and language throughout his play, or 
subverting them entirely using ridicule, Uys employs Shakespeare as both a model of good 
drama and also a tool to deride characters fixated on European culture. In doing so, Uys’s work 
opens up a space that draws on both cultures simultaneously to criticize Mandela, Mbeki, and 
Zuma’s shortfalls. The political critique Uys creates is heightened by its comparison with 
Macbeth because audiences familiar with Shakespeare’s play are aware that Uys’s work is an 
adaptation from a tragedy. The salient connections between Macbeth and South Africa’s political 
climate ahead of the 2009 national election encourage voters to take action. In this case the 
hybrid structure of Uys’s play creates a new way of viewing South Africa’s political 
circumstances. The hybrid moment is, as Bhabha argues in Jonathan Rutherford’s interview, a 
“‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge” (211). This is how I argue Shakespeare’s 
plot and language work in MacBeki, opening a new space from which to criticize colonial 
mimicry’s absolute elevation of European culture and knowledge over indigenous forms. 
Although MacBeki paints a somewhat bleak picture of the contemporary South African 
nation-state, it concludes in a contradictory manner. Uys’s concluding lines – spoken by a 
character impersonating Mandela – leave the audience with a positive image of the rainbow 
nation: “Whatever happens, we will all cope in one way or another. Let the Rainbow come back. 
The terrible hailstorm, at last, is over” (88). While the final passage is unquestionably hopeful, 
the ending seems hard to accept in light of the repeated examples of failed leadership throughout 
MacBeki – beginning with Maduba’s departure, followed by MacBeki’s colonial mimicry, and 
concluded with MacZum’s showerheadxviii. Rather, the ending seems to be done ironically, 
suggesting that perhaps the rainbow cannot return due to the extensive corruption and violence in 
the nation. This is presumably a final attempt to encourage South Africans to seek political 
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change at the ballot box. Ending the play in this manner indicates the country’s future rests in the 
hands of its citizens. Speaking out against the “instability of conditions” in the second 
interregnum, MacBeki draws attention to economic and social divisions still needing to be 
addressed in the nation-state in a manner that is both constructive and entertaining for citizens of 
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i
 Ashraf Jamal describes South Africa as experiencing a “jaundiced present moment” (19). For Jamal this crisis is 
caused by a “South African imaginary [that] has by no means weaned itself from the oppressive legacy” of 
colonialism and its stand-in, apartheid (19). MacBeki’s imitation of colonial culture exemplifies one of the ways that 
colonial and apartheid structures of domination continue to influence the post-apartheid nation; MacBeki models his 
behaviour and governance off of colonial ideals, continuing to oppress impoverished South Africans. 
 
ii
 The recent global economic crisis has exacerbated South Africa’s financial condition, contributing to the nation’s 
heightened unemployment rate. Steven Friedman’s article “An Accidental Advance? South Africa’s 2009 Elections” 
acknowledges that South Africa “has been affected by declines in investment and exports and is experiencing its 
first recession in seventeen years” (119). For Friedman, this economic shortfall increased anxiety amongst the 
business community as Zuma’s incoming ANC government was seen as a leftist-leaning leadership supported by 
trade unions such as COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. The situation that Friedman describes 
in South Africa also indicates that global investment has had a significant impact on South African politics because 
the economic downturn has encouraged politicians to consider the needs of the poor. This is most apparent in 
Friedman’s warning that South African politicians need to take the needs of the poor seriously if any recognizable 
changes in poverty reduction are to occur (120).  
 
iii
 Anne-Maria Makhulu argues that post-apartheid nation building may actually be continuing inequality, especially 
economic disparity, long after apartheid’s end: “National reconstruction, though a corollary of liberation, has been 
much complicated by the liberalization of markets in the past decade or so, fostering the conditions for perpetuating 
rather than eradicating inequality” (553). The opening up of markets to capitalist ventures in particular has 
heightened the imbalances in the nation, leading to increased urbanization as large numbers of citizens flock to 
cities. Highlighting the nation’s increased reliance on financial institutions after apartheid, Makhulu describes South 
Africa existing in an era “characterized by phenomena more or less global in scope” (553). 
 
iv
 Schiller’s article reports that at the commission for the Marikana massacre “lawyers for the miners’ families 
produced emails depicting the one-time anti-apartheid hero [Cyril Ramaphosa] as a hard-hearted businessman, 
decrying the miners’ ‘criminal conduct’ and calling on the government to crack down hard.” This is the same 
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Ramaphosa that Uys satirizes throughout MacBeki for corruptly leaving government in favour of financial rewards 
in the private sector. Uys’s criticism was written five years before the massacre.  It should also be noted that 
Ramaphosa is the former leader of the National Union of Mineworkers, a position that one expects to be occupied 
by a leader sympathetic to miners’ needs. Surrounded by such betrayal and violence, it is understandable that many 




 A Mail & Guardian article titled “Mbeki ‘Paid R30m Arms-Deal Bribe’” alleges Mbeki accepted money to ensure 
a contract for three navy submarines was awarded to MAN Ferrostaal, a German shipbuilder. The newspaper reports 
Mbeki defended himself from the accusation by claiming he gave two million rand to Zuma and transferred the rest 
of the sum to the ANC. Zuma’s involvement in the scandal broadened the scope of the political crisis as both Mbeki 
and Zuma were leading members of the ANC in 2008 when accusations were made. Zuma narrowly dodged 
corruption charges just prior to the 2009 national election, leading the ANC to a victory. 
 
vi
 Describing the 2009 national election, Friedman asserts that the ANC’s victory was described as an overwhelming 
victory by South African media because the party received more votes than was anticipated (116). Friedman argues 
the election results actually indicate dissatisfaction amongst ANC supporters as many who did vote appeared to be 
supporting the party, rather than its leadership: “neither the media commentary nor the ANC’s understanding of the 
election takes into account that, months before the election, many voters said that they would not vote for the ANC 
but did so in the end. These voters were not expressing allegiance to the current leadership; they were expressing 
loyalty to the party in spite of the leadership” (117). Friedman’s findings suggest a voter population that, in 2009, 
was growing dissatisfied with ANC political leaders and the numerous scandals that high profile politicians were 
involved in. Refer to Friedman for a description of Zuma’s court cases and voter response (114) as well as Mbeki’s 
inability to address the needs of impoverished South Africans (120). 
 
vii




 Mbeki and Ramaphosa were in competition for the position of Deputy President prior to South Africa’s first free 
elections. While Mbeki had more diplomatic experience, Ramaphosa’s role negotiating with the apartheid regime 
prior to the 1994 elections meant he was a strong contender to be Mandela’s deputy. After the election “Mandela 
chose Mbeki to be the first deputy president in the Government of National Unity,” causing Ramaphosa to quit 
politics and seek a business position in the private sector (South African History Online). 
 
ix
 The Porter’s direct address to the audience on page twenty three underscores how affirmative action policies have 
influenced his career in theatre. He laments the changes privately, because there were more job opportunities for him 
under apartheid, however he still claims to be “[a]n example of the surfeit of transformation in theatre” (23). 
  
x
 The portrayal of Mbeki in Uys’s play is based on a number of historical events in the politician’s life. Uys gives 
particular emphasis on Mbeki’s education in exile at Sussex University from December 1962 until May 1965 
completing a bachelor’s degree in economics and a subsequent Masters degree in the same field between 1965 and 
1968 (South African History Online). Additionally, characteristics such as Mbeki’s love of Shakespeare and music 
are accurate (South African History Online). Uys’s play diverges from a realistic portrayal of Mbeki and the 
circumstances surrounding his withdrawal from leadership by exaggerating negative attributes and incorporating 
characters and events from Macbeth. For example, while critics have accused Mbeki of supporting capitalist 
ventures in South Africa by enacting “pro-capitalist policies” and “endear[ing]… himself to global capitalism,” his 
blind greed and disregard for suffering Africans is presumably overblown (Van Wyk). Both during and after his 
presidency Mbeki has dedicated himself to resolving conflicts throughout Africa in countries such as Rwanda, Ivory 
Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (South African History Online). This being the case, Mbeki’s 
compassion for Africans suffering from conflict does not necessarily extend to impoverished South Africans. The 
former President has been faulted by many critics for failing to address the needs and concerns of poor South 
Africans during his presidency (Friedman 120) and favouring global capitalist ventures (Van Wyk). Lastly, events 
such as the usurpation of Maduba’s throne and the peasantry storming Luthuli Castle in Uys’s play were, in reality, 
political transitions that occurred through ANC party negotiations and an electoral loss at Polokwane. 
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xi
 Uys’s criticism of Mbeki’s years spent in exile eschews some of the key victories the politician helped secure 
abroad for the anti-apartheid movement. These victories include giving a speech at the UN in support of preserving 
the lives of the Rivonia Treason Trialists, leading numerous Sussex University Student Union marches and petitions, 
and also operating as an “ambassador to the steady flow of delegates from elite sectors of white South Africa” 
(South African History Online).   
 
xii
 Thamm notes that Uys’s play “gives literal expression to Karl Marx’s famous maxim that ‘history repeats itself as 
tragedy and then as farce.’” MacBeki epitomizes this transformation as events of grave importance and political 
gravity from South Africa’s past are reworked into comedy.  
 
xiii
 In this instance MacZum defers judgement to MacBeki concerning Maduba’s health. Having found a shirt 
covered in what he believed was blood, MacZum declares Maduba dead. Correcting MacZum, MacBeki points out 
that it is actually beetroot juice. This segment of the play also emphasizes the educational differences between Zuma 
and Mbeki, particularly when MacZum states: “I am humbled by your intellect and guile. You have a university 
degree and, according to the media, I have only Standard Three” (26). It is the educational difference between the 
two men that convinces MacZum to listen to MacBeki, preventing MacZum from probing further into the 
mysterious disappearance of Maduba. 
 
xiv
 The same kind of sentiment appears when the three businessmen, Sosal, Angla, and Giltfelds convince 
Ramabanquo to leave politics and join the business sector. Angla describes Ramabanquo as a “socialist fatally 
compromised by the trappings of wealth and affluence,” suggesting that even those opposed to commerce and 
economic exploitation of the workers are finding it difficult to resist corruption (45). 
 
xv
 Friedman argues the formation of Congress of the People – COPE – played a significant role in dividing the 
ANC’s traditional voter base (114).  Acknowledging that Zuma’s narrow avoidance of corruption charges prior to 
the election strained relations between the ANC and judges (118), and presumably many South Africans following 
the legal case, Friedman describes the electoral defeat as “the first sign that the ruling party was losing touch with 
some voters” (116). 
 
xvi
 Uys’s CV describes MacBeki as “his first new play since 2003” and documents Uys’s other creative works since 
MacBeki. Recent creative contributions include a cookbook, a fictional diary-journal for his character Evita, a 
fictional autobiography for Bambi Kellermann, the creation of his own cabaret theatre in a railway station, and the 
anticipated release of his newest play, The Merry Wives of Zuma. 
 
xvii
 Schiller describes the deaths of thirty four striking miners at the Lonmin platinum mine as “a massacre that 
rocked the nation.” It is within such a climate of instability and class unrest in South Africa that Schiller reports 
“some of the ‘young lions’ of the struggle against apartheid have become the ‘fat cats’ of a new, small black elite.” 
 
xviii
 Zuma, accused of raping an HIV positive woman in 2005, has often been lampooned in cartoons and media by 
depicting him with a shower nozzle extending from his head. Uys uses this prop to remind his readers of the serious 
accusation of rape levelled against Zuma, the ANC’s leader at the time of the play’s debut. David Smith explains the 
circumstances surrounding the rape case and the pertinence of the shower nozzle in a review of MacBeki: “Nor is 
there any mercy for Zuma. Three years ago, while standing trial for the rape of an HIV-positive woman, the 
politician, who did not wear a condom, said the sex was consensual and he then took a shower to minimise his 
chances of contracting the virus.” For Roxanne Bain, the rape trial epitomizes the dire location of women in post-
apartheid South Africa because Zuma’s accuser “suffered terrible stigmatisation on the part of Zuma and his 
supporters outside the court as well as by the Judge” (55). Although Zuma was eventually cleared of all charges 
many satirists, Uys included, gesture to this court case as an example of Zuma’s questionable ability to lead South 
Africa in the right direction after Mbeki. 
